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Comments
Should Payments to a Church for
Participation in Religious Practices be
Tax Deductible?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972 Katherine Graham, a member of the Church of
Scientology,1 made payments to the Church in the amount of
$1,682.2 Graham's payments entitled her and her children to partici-
pate in auditing and training sessions conducted by the Church.
These are forms of one-to-one counseling which are the central reli-
gious exercise of the Church. Graham and her children participated
in the sessions and Graham claimed a charitable contribution of
$1,682 on her 1972 federal income tax return.3 Maureen Staples and
Robert Hernandez, also members of the Church, also made pay-
ments to the Church for auditing and training4 and, like Graham,
participated in the sessions. They, like Graham, claimed a charitable
contribution on their federal income tax returns.5 The Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) disallowed the claimed deductions of all three
taxpayers." The IRS determined that the payments were not contri-
I. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
2. Graham v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 575, 579 (1984), affd, 822 F.2d 844, 847
(9th Cir. 1987).
3. Graham, 83 T.C. at 579.
4. Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1325 (8th Cir. 1987); Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1215 (1st Cir. 1987).
5. Staples, 821 F.2d. at 1325; Hernandez 819 F.2d at 1215.
6. Graham, 83 T.C. at 581; Staples, 821 F.2d at 1328; Hernandez, 819 F.2d at
1227. (Staples and Hernandez agreed to be bound by the stipulations in Graham.
Staples, 821 F.2d at 1325.)
butions, but rather were payments made for services. The taxpayers
petitioned the United States Tax Court to review the IRS decisions.
The tax court agreed with the IRS that the payments were not
charitable contributions within the meaning of Section 170(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code.7 Instead, the payments were nondeductible
personal expenditures for services rendered.8 Graham appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to overturn the decision
of the tax court. Staples made the same appeal to the Eighth Circuit
and Hernandez appealed to the First Circuit. On June 1, 1987, the
First Circuit affirmed the tax court in the case of Robert Her-
nandez.9 One month later, on July 1, 1987, the Eight Circuit re-
versed the tax court by holding that Staples' payments were a contri-
bution within the meaning of section 170.10 Sixteen days later the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the tax court by holding that Graham's pay-
ments were not a contribution within the meaning of section 170.11
Appeals parallel to those of Graham and Staples have been initi-
ated in every circuit of the court of appeals, except the Federal Cir-
cuit. 12 The First, Fourth and Ninth Circuits have joined in rejecting
the contention that the payments constitute charitable contribu-
tions. 13 The Eighth Circuit stands alone in its holding that the pay-
ments are contributions.1 4 The Graham and Staples decisions pre-
sent two very different approaches for determining what constitutes
a charitable contribution. The purpose of this Comment is to review
and evaluate the legal and analytical foundations of these inconsis-
tent decisions. This Comment will conclude that the decision of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to allow a charitable contribution
deduction is not in accord with the intent of Congress, nor is it con-
sistent with judicial precedent.
Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code provides the statutory
basis for the charitable contribution deduction. Section 170(a) allows
"as a deduction any charitable contribution (as defined in subsection
(c)) payment of which is made within the taxable year."15 Section
170(c) cryptically defines a charitable contribution as "a contribu-
tion or gift to or for the use of. . . [a] corporation, trust, or commu-
7. Graham, 83 T.C. at 581; see also Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104; Rev.
Rul. 78-189, 1978-1 C.B. 68.
8. Graham, 83 T.C. at 581.
9. Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1227.
10. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1328.
11. Graham, 822 F.2d at 850.
12. Miller v. IRS, 829 F.2d 500, 501 (4th Cir. 1987).
13. See, e.g., Hernandez, 819 F.2d 1212; Miller, 829 F.2d 500; Graham, 822
F.2d 844.
14. See Staples, 821 F.2d 1324.
15. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (1988) (The I.R.C. has permitted taxpayers to deduct
contributions to designated non-profit organizations since 1917. Section 170 was enacted
in 1954. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 502.).
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nity chest, fund, or foundation . . . organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes .. ."I" The Treasury Regulations provide no further defi-
nition of either the term contribution or gift.17 The absence of a
clear congressional definition has left the courts with the task of de-
fining the limits of deductibility under section 170.8
In 1986 the Supreme Court decided United States v. American
Bar Endowment.9 The Court was faced directly with the task of
defining the standard for determining when a payment is a charita-
ble contribution. The Supreme Court held that a taxpayer "must at
a minimum demonstrate that he purposely contributed money or
property in excess of the value of any benefit he received in re-
turn."20 By this holding the Court has adopted a two-pronged test
that the taxpayer must satisfy before the taxpayer may deduct a
payment as a deduction. The taxpayer must demonstrate that the
payment exceeded the value of any return benefit and the taxpayer
must demonstrate that the excess payment was made with the inten-
tion of making a gift. American Bar Endowment established the le-
gal standard defining the limits of the charitable contribution.21 The
Supreme Court left the IRS and trial courts with the task of making
the factual determinations as to the value of the return benefit and
the subjective intentions of the taxpayer.22
It was one year after American Bar Endowment that the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Katherine Graham's deduc-
tion. The Graham court stated that "[t]he rule in this circuit is that
a charitable gift or contribution must be a payment made for de-
tached and disinterested motives. This formulation is designed to en-
sure that the payor's primary purpose is to assist the charity and not
16. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B).
17. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1 (as amended in 1972).
18. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 502 ("[T]he Internal Revenue Code ... [has] never
defined the term 'contribution or gift."); see also DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373,
377 (9th Cir. 1962), affig, 36 T.C. 896, 899 (1961); see generally Hobbet, Charitable
Contributions - How Charitable Must They Be?, I1 SETON HALL 1 (1980).
19. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986), rev'g and
remanding, 761 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985), affig in part, rev'g and remanding in part, 4
Cl. Ct. 404 (1984).
20. 477 U.S. at 118.
21. Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1216 ("Our analysis of this question is framed by the
Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the scope of the charitable contribution
deduction. .. ").
22. See American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 118; see also Commissioner v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960).
to secure some benefit personal to the payor."23 The Graham court
stated "[w]e think this approach is a proper approach and find it in
full accord with the Supreme Court's recent opinion in United States
v. American Bar Endowment.' 24 In the same month, the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that Maureen Staples' participation in auditing was "not a
recognizable return benefit under section 170, [and therefore] the
analysis of American Bar Endowment by its very nature was inappli-
cable to the situation .... -25 In June 1987, the First Circuit di-
rectly applied the American Bar Endowment two-pronged test and
denied the claimed deductions of scientologist Robert Hernandez,2"
The First Circuit directly applied American Bar Endowment; the
Ninth Circuit followed American Bar Endowment but applied a dif-
ferent legal standard; and the Eighth Circuit distinguished the
American Bar Endowment analysis. Because each of these decisions
was based on the same code section, the same precedent and the
same facts, the inconsistent outcomes cannot be reconciled. If one
accepts deductibility according to Staples, then one must reject the
decision of Graham, and vice versa.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S TwO-PRONGED TEST FOR
DEDUCTIBILITY
The Supreme Court decided United States v. American Bar En-
dowment in 1986. This was the first time the high court had ad-
dressed the issue of deductibility under Internal Revenue Code sec-
tion 170. The decision was binding precedent on each of the courts
of appeals which decided the scientologist cases. Any meaningful
analysis of the scientology decisions must be done in the light of
American Bar Endowment; the following key elements of that deci-
sion are presented as background.
The American Bar Endowment (ABE) is a charitable organiza-
tion exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code. " The ABE promotes legal research and education in
23. Graham, 822 F.2d at 848. The Graham Court adopted the disinterested mo-
tives test established by the Supreme Court in Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 286, 289. Gra-
ham, 822 F.2d at 849.
24. Graham, 822 F.2d at 849.
25. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1328.
26. Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1218 ("[W]e conclude that Hernandez has failed to
shoulder the burden assigned by the Supreme Court." (footnote omitted)).
27. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 107. The recipient organization must
meet this requirement in order to entitle the contributing taxpayer to take a charitable
deduction. It should be noted that the IRS has challenged, and the tax court has ruled,
that the Church of Scientology does not qualify as a tax exempt organization. Church of
Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, 443 (1984). In the Graham, Staples, and
Hernandez cases the government stipulated that the Church was qualified under I.R.C. §
501(a). Graham, 822 F.2d at 846; Staples, 821 F.2d at 1325; Hernandez, 819 F.2d at
1216.
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order to advance the administration of justice. All members of the
American Bar Association are automatically members of the ABE,
but the ABE is a separate legal entity. The ABE raises money for its
charitable works by providing group life, health, accident and disa-
bility insurance policies to its members. These policies are underwrit-
ten by insurance companies. All of the ABE insurance plans are par-
ticipating plans. This type of plan offers the possibility that dividends
may be refunded to the insured members (insureds) at the end of
each year based on the premiums collected and the claims paid. Al-
though the dividends would normally be paid to the insureds, mem-
bers of the ABE are required by the ABE to assign these dividends
to the ABE as a condition for participating in the insurance plan.
These dividends are used by the ABE for its charitable purposes. 8
Four individual members of the ABE claimed a charitable contri-
bution deduction for the dividend refunded on their behalf by the
insurance companies to the ABE.29 The four individual actions were
consolidated by the claims court to determine if the ABE members
were entitled to a charitable deduction for a portion of their premi-
ums paid. The taxpayers urged the theory that the premiums paid
represented a dual payment - part for insurance and part as a con-
tribution to the ABE's charitable activities.30
The procedural history of American Bar Endowment illustrates
the confusion of the lower federal courts in determining what was a
section 170 contribution.31 The claims court cited a 1967 revenue
ruling as authority for the proposition that a single payment could
have dual characteristics. 2 The court then relied on the same reve-
nue ruling to support its decision that the ABE members had failed
to demonstrate that they bought goods or services for more than
their economic value, with the intention that the excess be used to
benefit a charity.33 Thus, the claims court denied the deductions.34
28. American Bar Endowment, 761 F.2d at 1574.
29. American Bar Endowment, 4 C1. Ct. 404, 408 (1984).
30. Id. at 414.
31. See generally Hobbet, supra note 18.
32. American Bar Endowment, 4 Cl. Ct. at 415 (citing Rev. Rul. 68-4432, 1968-
2 C.B. 104 and Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967 C.B. 104-105.) These revenue rulings address the
issue of deductibility of payments when the payor receives a benefit in return. These
rulings recognize that admission to a charitable fund raising event and membership in a
charitable organization are return benefits.
33. American Bar Endowment, 4 Cl. Ct. at 415 (citing to Rev. Rul. 67-246,
1967-2 C.B. 104, 105.) It is helpful to note that the IRS applied, in this 1967 ruling, the
two-pronged standard for deductibility which the Supreme Court would adopt almost
twenty years later in American Bar Endowment.
34. Id. at 418.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that "well
established principles of tax law from this circuit and elsewhere re-
quire that we reject the unitary approach of the court below. . .. "3,
The Federal Circuit first stated that the test applied by the claims
court placed too harsh a burden on taxpayers by requiring them to
prove a charitable motivation of disinterested generosity. 36 Second,
the Federal Circuit stated that the claims court's "overly-precise for-
mulaic test" assumes that all persons are economic persons acting
solely on a careful and detailed comparative investigation of pecuni-
ary results.37 The court noted that in life, an intention to enter into a
charitable transaction is often intertwined with other motivations, in-
cluding some that are non-charitable. The Federal Circuit posed the
issue as whether the transaction was of a business or a charitable
nature.38 The court noted that the record was bare as to the nature
of the dealings between ABE and its members and, therefore, the
court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine
whether the nature of the relationship between the ABE and its
members was predominantly of a business nature or whether the
transaction had a substantial charitable component.39
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and upon review, held that
the claims court had applied the proper standard.4 0 "The sine qua
non of a charitable contribution is the transfer of money or property
without adequate consideration. The taxpayer, therefore, must at a
minimum demonstrate that he purposely contributed money or prop-
erty in excess of the value of any benefit he received in return.' 1
Thus, the holding of American Bar Endowment placed the burden
on the taxpayer to prove two elements - intent to make a gift and
excess value over that received in return.42 Applying this standard,
the Court affirmed the claims court decision to deny the tax deduc-
tion for each of the four taxpayers.43
The American Bar Endowment decision illustrates the conjunctive
35. American Bar Endowment, 761 F.2d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
36. Id. at 1581. The Federal Circuit relied to a great extent on Singer Co. v.
United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971), reh'g denied, 197 Ct. Cl. 1091 (1972), in
which the court of claims rejected the Duberstein disinterested motives test. The Su-
preme Court decision in American Bar Endowment overrules Singer on this point.
37. American Bar Endowment, 761 F.2d at 1582; compare with American Bar
Endowment, 477 U.S. at 117. The Supreme Court, by placing the burden on the tax-
payer to prove intent and excess value, is assuming that such detailed comparative analy-
sis will be conducted by the taxpayer before making the payment to the charitable
organization.
38. American Bar Endowment, 761 F.2d at 1582.
39. Id. at 1583.
40. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 118.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 117.
43. Id. at 117-18.
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nature of the two-pronged test."' Three of the taxpayers had failed
to establish they could have obtained insurance for less money.
Lacking such a showing, the Court assumed that the value of the
ABE's insurance to these taxpayers at least equalled their premium
payments.45 The claims court had stated that the lack of information
as to less expensive insurance does not support a finding that the
taxpayer acted for reasons other than his own economic interest.4 6 It
was upon this rationale that the Court rested its holding that these
taxpayers had failed to meet the second prong of the test, namely
that they had transferred money in excess of the benefit received in
return.47 The fourth taxpayer established the excess value prong, but
failed to demonstrate that he had purposely paid more than the mar-
ket value because he intended to make a contribution. The taxpayer
had testified that he was aware that a portion of his premium pay-
ment would go to the ABE. The Court held that such awareness is
not sufficient to establish charitable intent.48 The Court further
noted that nothing in the record suggested that the taxpayer had
bypassed the opportunity for cheaper insurance in order to make a
contribution to the ABE.49
The Supreme Court decision in American Bar Endowment has es-
tablished the two-pronged test for determining when a payment to a
qualified organization is a tax deductible contribution.
III. THE SCIENTOLOGY CASES
Before examining the Scientology cases it is helpful to make a few
observations. The deductibility of a payment to a qualified organiza-
tion is only brought into question when the payor receives a benefit
in return, as in American Bar Endowment and the Scientology cases.
This has two implications: first, there must be a benefit received; and
second, it must be received in exchange for the payment. Hence, the
issues which arise in the Scientology cases revolve around the exis-
tence of a benefit and an exchange.
44. Id. (the taxpayer must satisfy both elements of the standard in order to claim
a charitable contribution deduction).
45. Id. at 117.
46. Id. at 118.
47. Id.
48. Id. (the court's language is strong with regard to proof on intent to make a
gift. The fact that the money was in fact used for a charitable purpose is not relevant.
The taxpayer must prove the intent to make a gift).
49. Id.
A. Factual Background
Scientologists believe that in every person an immortal spiritual
being exists independent of body and mind. A scientologist becomes
aware of this unconscious spiritual dimension through a process
called auditing. Auditing sessions are conducted individually, but are
not individually tailored. The sessions are ritualistic in nature.
Scientologists also take training courses in which they study the doc-
trines, tenets, codes, policies, and practices of the Church.50 The gov-
ernment stipulated to the fact that auditing and training were the
essential religious practices of Scientology.51
One of the tenets of Scientology is that any time a person receives
something, he must pay something back. This is called the doctrine
of exchange. The Church applies this doctrine by charging a fixed
donation for auditing and training. The fixed donations are generally
a prerequisite to a person's participation in the practices. The
Church publishes an established price list for the services. The
Church encourages members to pay in advance by offering a five
percent discount. The Church issues accounts to members. Payments
are credited to the account and the account is debited when the
member begins receiving a service. The Church has a policy to re-
fund advance payments upon request at any time before services are
received.52
B. Procedural Background
Many Scientology members had claimed deductions for payments
made to the Church for auditing and training sessions." The IRS
initially challenged the deductibility of the payments in a 1978 reve-
nue ruling,54 concluding that such payments, like tuition fees paid to
private or church schools,5 5 were not deductible unless the taxpayer
proved the donation exceeded the fair market value of the benefits
received in return. Katherine Graham's case became the tax court's
test case, with the IRS and the taxpayers, Miller and Hernandez
included, agreeing to be bound by the relevant factual and legal find-
50. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1325.
51. Id. See also Miller, 829 F.2d at 501.
52. See generally Staples, 821 F.2d at 1325; Graham, 822 F.2d at 846, 847.
53. Miller, 829 F.2d at 501 (perhaps 1,000 taxpayers have claimed deductions for
payments made to the Church of Scientology for auditing and training sessions).
54. Rev. Rul. 78-189, 1978-2 C.B. 68-69 (the IRS ruled the scientologists were
not entitled to a charitable deduction for any part of the fixed donation made to the
Church to pay for the services unless the taxpayer could establish that the fixed donation
exceeded the market value of the benefits received).
55. See id.; see also Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972) (a
deduction was denied for tuition paid to private or church schools in the form of dona-
tions); see also DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
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ings of the court in the Graham case.56
The tax court held that Katherine Graham's payments were not
deductible contributions. 7 The court noted that the taxpayer had the
burden of proving that the payment was a voluntary transfer without
consideration .5 The tax court focused on the external features of the
transaction in reaching its determination that Graham had made the
payments and had received religious services and thereby received
perceived benefit from the transfer.59 Graham and other taxpayers
appealed to the court of appeals. Graham argued that the tax court
had applied the incorrect rule of law by failing to focus on the na-
ture of the benefits she received, i.e., religious benefits .6 Staples and
Hernandez argued that, as a matter of law, the return of a religious
benefit, as opposed to an economic or financial benefit, cannot result
in denial of a section 170 deduction. 1
C. The Graham Decision
The Ninth Circuit did not accept Graham's contention. The
Graham court began its opinion by stating "the rule in this circuit is
that a charitable gift or contribution must be a payment made for
detached and disinterested motives."6 3 The court felt this was the
proper test for ensuring that no measurable, specific return comes to
the payor as a quid pro quo for the donation. The court found this
test to be in full accord with the Supreme Court's opinion in Ameri-
can Bar Endowment and also found support in the congressional
record. 4
The court went on to examine the relevance of the type of benefit
received by the payor. The court concluded that the type of benefit
received is not important, just whether there is a specific, measurable
quid pro quo.65 The inquiry remains whether the donation was in-
56. Miller, 829 F.2d at 501.
57. Graham, 83 T.C. at 581.
58. Id. at 580.
59. Id. at 580-81.
60. Graham, 822 F.2d at 848. Note that the taxpayer is not challenging the tax
court's finding of a bargained for exchange.
61. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326; Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1216-7.
62. Graham, 822 F.2d at 848.
63. Id. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
64. Graham, 822 F.2d at 849 (citing S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 196,
reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4629, 4831). This report presents
the discussion accompanying the passage of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. This pas-
sage is the single instance in which Congress defines the term charitable gift.
65. Id.
tended to benefit the charity without reference to a reciprocal and
specific benefit to the donor, whether or not the benefit is religious.00
The court reached the factual determination that Graham had
made the payments with the expectation of receiving a definite num-
ber of hours of auditing in return.6 7 The court also concluded that
the auditing sessions had measurable attributes. The court focused
on the external features of the transaction in reaching these conclu-
sions. The set price lists, the contractual right to receive the sessions
or a right to a refund, account cards and discounts for advance pay-
ments all underscored that the transaction was structured in the
form of a quid pro quo and that the benefits had a measurable
value. 8 The last task for the court was to determine the value of the
religious benefits. The court's only statement as to valuation was that
it "was easy for the tax court to determine . . . [value] simply by
looking at the amount of money they were willing to pay for it in a
market setting."6 D
D. The Staples Decision
Maureen Staples urged the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit to accept her contention that the tax system does not treat reli-
gious services as commodities that are purchased and therefore she
did not receive a recognizable return benefit for her charitable pay-
ments.70 The court agreed with her and allowed her to deduct her
payments as contributions.71
The court began its analysis by stating that a construction of sec-
tion 170 "sensitive to religious practices would be consistent with the
policies underlying the statutory provision."72 Further, "[i]n the case
of a contribution to a charitable organization, the law's policy finds
charity in the purpose and works of the qualifying organization, not
the subjective intent of the contributor. ' 73 The Staples court cited a
1971 revenue ruling in support of the proposition that religious ob-
servance of any faith is considered to be of benefit to the general
public as well as to the members of the faith, "with private benefit
66. Id.
67. Id. at 850.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1327; see also Rev. Rui. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105
(stating that if the payment is in the form of a purchase of an item of value then the
presumption arises that no gift has been made). The Staples court concluded that no
such presumption arises when the item purchased was the right to participate in religious
practices. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1327.
71. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1327.
72. Id. at 1326 (construing Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 151 (1934)).
73. Id. (citing Crosby Valve and Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146, 147
(1st Cir. 1967)), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967).
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being merely incidental to the broader good that is served. '74
With these observations in mind, the court cited Haack v. United
States, a 1978 opinion, stating that "Congress recognized that when
a contributor would receive a material quid pro quo, the amount of
the donation. . . would be reduced by the cost of providing the tan-
gible benefit."'7 5 The adjectives "material" and "tangible" replaced
the adjectives "specific" and "measurable" which were used by the
Graham court. The final step for the court was to cite Murphy v.
Commissioner, a tax court decision, in support of the proposition
that spiritual gain to a member cannot be valued by any measure
known in the secular realm and as such, privileges arising from
church membership are not significant return benefits within the
meaning of section 170.6 It was upon these authorities that the
court based its holding that regardless of the circumstances sur-
rounding the payment, "an amount remitted to a . . . church with
no return other than participation in strictly religious practices is a
contribution within the meaning of section 170. ''
After stating its holding, the court went on to state that "because
of the inherently charitable nature of religious practices and because
of the incongruity of attempting to place a market value on religious
participation" it was hesitant to agree with the First Circuit that the
payments are not contributions.78 Moreover, the court stated the ab-
sence of a tangible return benefit with a measurable secular value
makes the analysis of American Bar Endowment inapplicable by its
very nature to the Staples situation. 9
E. The Hernandez Decision
Scientologist Robert Hernandez asked the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit to conclude that, as a matter of law, the return of a
commensurate religious benefit, as opposed to a financial or eco-
nomic benefit, cannot result in the denial of a section 170 deduc-
tion.80 The court first noted that Hernandez' claim, that all pay-
ments to churches for religious services, whether gifts or not, should
be deductible under section 170, was contrary to the plain language
74. Id; Rev. Rul. 71-580, 1971-72 C.B. 235, 236.
75. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1327 (citing Haak v. U.S., 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1091
(W.D. Mich. 1978)).
76. Id. (citing Murphy v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 249, 253 (1970)).
77. id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1328.
80. Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1216-17.
and legislative history of section 170.81 "Section 170 explicitly pro-
vides that payments to churches and other qualifying organizations
are deductible only if they are 'contribution [s] or gift[s].'- 82 The
court stated that it could find no indication that Congress intended
to distinguish religious benefits from medical, scientific, educational,
literary, or other benefits which could likewise provide consideration
for a nondeductible payment to a charitable organization. 8
Having decided that the nature of the benefits, religious or not,
was not relevant for section 170 purposes, the court moved on to
consider valuation issues. Hernandez claimed it was impossible for
the government .to determine the economic value of religious bene-
fits. 4 The court noted that the government had assigned economic
value to secular benefits such as adoption services, symphony per-
formances and museum admission, even though those services are, in
theory, difficult to monetize."' The court stated that in these cases
courts do not look to the intrinsic value of the benefits, but instead
either to "(1) the price set by the service providers, (2) the prices set
by providers of similar services, or (3) the costs of providing the
service."8 6
Having concluded that religious benefits could provide the quid
pro quo of a nondeductible payment and that a monetary value
could be placed on religious benefits, the court applied the two-
pronged test of American Bar Endowment.87 The court noted that
Hernandez had not alleged that his intentions were any different
from Katherine Graham's, nor did Hernandez claim he had contrib-
uted money in excess of the benefit he received in return. The court
had little difficulty in holding that Hernandez had failed to shoulder
the burden of proof assigned him by the Supreme Court.88
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Preference For Religious Organizations or Practices
As Graham and Staples are essentially different interpretations of
section 170, a logical place to begin an analysis is with the courts'




85. Id. (citing Murphy, 54 T.C. 249 (mandatory fee paid to an adoption agency
is not deductible); Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104 (price of a ticket to a charity event
is deductible only to the extent it exceeds the value of the admission); Rev. Rul. 68432,
1968-2 C.B. 104 (the cost of museum membership is not deductible when the taxpayer
enjoys free admission to poetry readings)).
86. Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1217.
87. Id. at 1218.
88. Id.
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treatment of the statute. Section 170 in its simplest form authorizes
a deduction for contributions to religious, charitable, scientific, liter-
ary and educational purposes. The Graham court noted that the stat-
ute cannot be read to favor religious over non-religious organizations
and, therefore, the deductibility of a payment does not depend on
whether the benefits received in return are secular or religious.,,
Staples, on the other hand, stated that a construction of section 170
"sensitive to religious practices would be consistent with the policies
underlying the statutory provision." 90 The Staples court did not ex-
pressly state whether it would extend this same sensitive construction
to non-religious benefits, such as symphony performances. However,
the implication is certainly that religious practices merit some spe-
cial treatment. The court cited a 1934 Supreme Court case, Helver-
ing v. Bliss,"' as support for this sensitive construction.92 However, in
Bliss, the Supreme Court was addressing the mechanics of how a
taxpayer should take charitable contributions into account when de-
termining taxable income.93 The court was not addressing substan-
tive issues under the charitable contribution statute.9" Hence, the re-
ligious or non-religious nature of the organization was irrelevant to
the holding in Bliss.95 The Bliss decision supports a broad construc-
tion of the charitable contribution deduction, but certainly does not
support favoring religious over non-religious organizations or donors.
The Staples decision also cited Crosby Valve & Gage v. Commis-
sioner,96 a 1967 decision out of the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, stating that "the law's policy finds charity in the purposes
and works of the qualifying organization and not in the subjective
intent of the contributor." 97 Notwithstanding the fact that the cited
passage is dictum,98 the passage does not support a construction of
89. Graham, 822 F.2d at 849.
90. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326.
91. Helvening v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934).
92. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326.
93. Helvering, 293 U.S. at 145 ("These cases present the question whether de-
ductions on account of charitable contributions are to be taken from net income ... or
from ordinary net income.").
94. See id. at 146. (The taxpayer, Bliss, had made charitable contributions total-
ling $44,000. There was no dispute as to whether the amount paid qualified as a charita-
ble deduction.).
95. See id. The Bliss decision does not even identify the religious or non-religious
nature of the charitable organization involved.
96. 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967).
97. Crosby Valve & Gage, 380 F.2d at 147.
98. Id. The court affirmed on the alternate ground that there was no reason for a
difference in tax treatment merely because the income was earned by a wholly owned
section 170 favoring religious organizations. Further, the authority is
clearly overruled by the Supreme Court decision in American Bar
Endowment. The Graham and Hernandez decisions relied on a sim-
ple reading of the code. Section 170 draws no distinction among the
various types of organizations. The statute simply lists the types of
organizations in a simple series, communicating no governmental
preference for any particular organization. The fact that the benefits
received by the taxpayer are religious should not bear on the deter-
mination of deductibility of the payments.
B. Relevance of The Type of Benefit Received
As previously stated, the issue of deductibility arises whenever the
taxpayer receives a benefit in return for a payment. The Staples
court concluded that because the right to participate in religious
practices could not be valued in monetary terms and because the
benefit was not material or tangible, it was therefore not a recogniz-
able return benefit.9 The Graham court, on the other hand, had no
difficulty in concluding that the religious practices were a specific,
measurable return, and therefore adequate to preclude a deduc-
tion.100 The Staples court found support for its decision because the
benefits received by the scientologists were (1) religious, (2) intangi-
ble, and (3) not capable of being valued in monetary terms. 101
The Scientology cases are certainly not the first time the courts
have addressed the issue of deductibility of payments for religious
benefits.102 However, because all of the prior cases arose before
American Bar Endowment, the central issue was how the courts
should determine whether the payment was a gift. The courts did not
attempt to identify and separate the religious and secular aspects of
the return benefits. 10 3
In Staples, the taxpayers were not contending the fact that there
was an exchange or the fact that they received benefits, rather, they
were contending that religious benefits are not recognizable. 0 4 The
Staples court cited the 1970 tax court decision, Murphy v. Commis-
sioner,05 for support that religious practices are not recognizable. 100
However, the issue in Murphy was the deductibility of payments
made to a nonprofit, secular, adoption agency.'0 7 The Murphy court
subsidiary rather than directly by the tax exempt organization.
99. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1327.
100. Graham, 822 F.2d at 849.
101. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1327-8.
102. See generally Hobbet, supra note 18.
103. See generally Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1217.
104. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326.
105. 54 T.C. 249 (1970).
106. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326.
107. Murphy, 54 T.C. at 250.
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used religious practices as an example of a type of benefit which can
inure to the general public and only incidentially to the taxpayer
making the payment. It is generally accepted that indirect, or inci-
dental benefits are not recognizable. 0 8 The Murphy court focused
upon the indirect nature, not the religious nature of the benefits. As
such, Murphy does not support the broad proposition that all reli-
gious practices are nonrecognizable, rather that all indirect benefits
are nonrecognizable.0 9
The facts in the scientology cases do not support the conclusion
that the auditing sessions are an indirect benefit."10 The very struc-
ture of the transaction serves to insure that the benefit of the audit-
ing session inured primarily to the one who pays the fixed fee.' The
Church's literature emphasizes that the benefit of auditing is per-
sonal. Contrary to Staples, the weight of authority does not support
that the religious nature of the benefits is relevant to recognizabil-
ity." 2 The facts do not support that the benefits of auditing inure
primarily to the general public and only indirectly to the paying
members.
The legislative record of section 170 sheds no light on the issue of
the type of return benefits. 113 However, there is a passage in the rec-
ord pertaining to section 163,"11 entitled Trade or Business Expense,
which has been cited by American Bar Endowment, Graham and
Staples. This passage defines a charitable contribution as a payment
"made with no expectation of a financial return commensurate with
the amount of the [contribution]."5 The Staples court essentially
interpreted this statement as meaning that the sole type of return
benefit which Congress intended to exclude was a financial benefit.,"
The Staples court pointed out that the cases dealing with non-de-
ductible payments "generally have referred to a material, financial,
or economic benefit being received in return."" 7 The Graham court
108. Id. at 253 (indirect benefits "are not significant return benefits that have a
monetary value within the meaning of section 170.").
109. Id.
110. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 505.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 504 ("neither statute nor case law embody any fundamental dis-
tinction between 'religious' and 'economic' benefits").
113. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 64, at 4017, 4050, 4660, 4843. The legislative
review does not discuss the definition of the term contribution, rather the discussion cen-
ters on the technical, mechanical aspects of calculating the deduction.
114. Id. at 4831.
115. Id.
116. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326.
117. Id.
concluded that the test is not the economic character of what the
payor receives, but whether there is a specific and measurable quid
pro quo for the donation."8 Did Congress or the Supreme Court
intend to provide a blanket exclusion for all intangible and
noneconomic benefits?
The legislative history does define the quid pro quo in terms of a
financial return." 9 However, one sentence later, the Senate Report
says the contribution deduction applies "only if there [is] no expecta-
tion of any quid pro quo.' 0 In this sentence the adjective is "any."
Similarly, the Supreme Court said "any" quid pro quo in its Ameri-
can Bar Endowment decision. "The taxpayer. . . must. . . demon-
strate that he [or she] purposely contributed money . . . in excess of
the value of any benefit received in return.' 121 Admittedly, the bene-
fits received by the taxpayer in American Bar Endowment were fi-
nancial, but the Supreme Court cited two prior decisions in which
the lower courts disallowed payments because the taxpayer received
intangible services in return. 22 In 1968 the IRS ruled that an annual
membership in an art museum was a return benefit sufficient to bar
a deduction. 23 The charitable purpose of the art society was to de-
velop the study of art. The benefits received by the members were
participation in art events, showings, and lectures. As the code states
no preference for religious practices, it is difficult to see how the ben-
efits of the scientologists differ from those of the art museum mem-
bers. The Staples conclusion that religious benefits are, as a matter
of law, not recognizable under section 170124 seems unsupported by
the clear, plain language of the legislative history, the Supreme
Court precedent, and the IRS ruling.
C. Relevance of Valuation
The Staples court concluded that the right to participate in reli-
gious practices "cannot be valued by measure known in the secular
realm.' 25 The court stated that, "[w]e are hesitant to accept [that
participation in religious practices is adequate consideration] both
because of the inherently charitable nature of strictly religious prac-
tices and because of the incongruity of attempting to place a market
118. Graham, 822 F.2d at 849.
119. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 64, at 4831.
120. Id.
121. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 118.
122. Id. (citing Murphy, 54 T.C. at 254 and Oppewal, 468 F.2d at 1002).
123. Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104, 105 (the membership payments had a
reasonable relationship to the monetary value of the corresponding benefits of
membership).
124. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1328.
125. Id. at 1327.
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value on religious participation."' 6 Bear in mind that the Supreme
Court held that value is a factual determination for the court with
the burden of proof on the taxpayer. 2 How the Staples court can
justify elevating the valuation issue to a legal significance is not
clear.
Both the Graham and Hernandez courts properly treated the valu-
ation issue as one of fact. 2 ' The Hernandez court cited authority for
various valuation alternatives available to courts in different situa-
tions. 29 In such cases the courts and the IRS look not to the intrin-
sic value of the benefits, but instead either to (1) the price set by the
providers, (2) the price set by providers of similar services, or (3) the
costs of providing the services. 11°
Finally, the fact that the Church is able to place a fixed value on
the services undermines the Staples conclusion that it is improper to
place a value on such religious practices. Even if one assumes that
the taxpayer could successfully carry the burden of proving the reli-
gious benefits have no economic value, the logical conclusion is that
only one prong of the American Bar Endowment test would have
been met, i.e., the excess value prong. The taxpayer would still have
to convince the court that the excess payment was made with the
intention of making a gift rather than the intention of receiving
services.
D. Relevance of Transactional Form
In Graham, the tax court found that the Church was operating in
a commercial manner by providing the auditing and training
courses.' 3 ' The payments to the Church had all of the characteristics
of a payment for retail goods. The Church even called the donation
an exchange. The substance of a contribution is the lack of an ex-
change. Yet the Staples court looked not at the obvious exchange
but rather at the religious nature of the Scientology activities and
126. Id. (though the statement appears to be dicta).
127. See Graham, 822 F.2d at 849; Babilonia v. Commissioner, 681 F.2d 678, 679
(9th Cir. 1982).
128. Graham, 822 F.2d at 849. In Hernandez, the court found Hernandez had
failed to carry the burden of the American Bar Endowment test based on the factual
findings of the record. Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1218.
129. Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1218.
130. Id. at 1217. See also Graham, 83 T.C. at 578. "The Church of Scientology
operates in a commercial manner in providing these religious services. In fact, one of its
[the Church's] articulated goals is to make money." Graham, 83 T.C. at 578.
131. Graham, 83 T.C. at 578.
the benefits received.13 2 The Staples court stated that Graham
amounts.to a holding that "the deductibility under section 170 of
payments relative to participation in bona fide religious practices will
depend on the mechanism adopted by the church to solicit support
from its members. '133 Although this statement is not true in a legal
sense, it certainly has bearing in assessing the circumstances of the
case. The American Bar Endowment analysis and holding make the
circumstances attending the payment very relevant to determining
both the intentions of the payor and the existence of excess value.3 4
The arguments in Staples fail to recognize that even payments to a
church for religious services can be structured, as here, so that the
religious services are a quid pro quo for the payment.
V. CONCLUSION
Through section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code Congress, has
provided taxpayers with the means to support charitable organiza-
tions with tax deductible gifts. Congress said, and meant gifts, not
payments. The Supreme Court supplemented the code by defining
exactly what a taxpayer must demonstrate in order to claim a chari-
table deduction. The American Bar Endowment test is true to the
intent of section 170 in that it allows a deduction for gifts and ex-
cludes a deduction for payments. Admittedly, the factual determina-
tion of the payor's subjective intentions and the objective determina-
tion of value can be difficult, but that is the task assigned by the
Supreme Court. The Staples court chose to ignore an obvious ex-
change situation and instead looked to the ecclesiastical nature of
the return benefit. Clearly, the scientologists were not making gifts
to the Church, yet the Staples court held that the scientologists sat-
isfied the requirements for a section 170 deduction. The Graham and
Hernandez decisions properly recognized that the religious nature of
return benefits is not relevant to the determination of deductibility
under section 170. The split in authority created by the Graham and
Staples decisions should be eliminated by codification of the Ameri-
can Bar Endowment two-pronged test.
TED D. BILLBE, II
132. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326.
133. Id.
134. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 117.
